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Tull v. United States: The Right to a
Jury Trial in a Statutory Proceeding
INTRODUCTION

On April 28, 1987, the United States Supreme Court added
yet another decision to the long list of Supreme Court opinions
which define a party's right to a jury trial under the seventh
amendment' to the United States Constitution. In Tull v. United
States2 the Court held that the seventh amendment guarantees a
jury trial to determine liability3 in actions by the federal government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean
Water Act (the Act).4 The Court did not, however, extend the
jury trial guarantee to the assessment of civil penalties under the
Act. 5 In reaching its decision, the Court determined that actions
by the government under the Act seeking civil penalties and
injunctive relief are analogous to eighteenth century actions in
debt. Such actions in debt were historically within the jurisdiction of English courts of law. 6 Therefore, under the frequently
cited analysis of the seventh amendment in Parsons v. Bedford,7

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States than according to the rules
of the common law. U.S. CONsr. amend. VII.
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
Id. at 427.
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act [hereinafter Clean Water Act], Pub. L.
No. 95-217, 92 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
1 481 U.S. at 427. This issue, though important, is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
Id. at 418.

28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830). The court reasoned: "In a just sense, the amendment
then may well be construed to embrace all suits, which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal
rights." Id. at 446.
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and its settled applicability to causes of action created by congressional enactment, 8 a jury trial must be available.
This Comment places Tull in its historical perspective by
briefly discussing some of the major Supreme Court opinions
preceding Tull which interpret the seventh amendment. It discusses the Tull case and distinguishes it from Atlas Roofing Co.
v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission.9 Finally,
the Comment applies Tull to causes of action under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 0 and the Clean
Air Act."

I.

THE EARLIER CASES

A brief 12 discussion of several important prior United States
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the seventh amendment,
particularly regarding statutory actions, provides a useful perspective on Tull. In Hepner v. United States3 and United States
v. Regan,' 4 the Supreme Court, in dicta, acknowledged a seventh
amendment right to a jury trial in suits brought under a statute
by the government to collect a civil penalty. The Regan court
characterized the proceedings as a civil "action of debt"' 6 and
ruled invalid a jury instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt."

I Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974) ("[W]e have often found the
Seventh Amendment applicable to causes of action based on statutes." Id. at 193.).
430 U.S. 442 (1977). See infra notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
1oSurface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter SMCRA],
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
1 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 [hereinafter Clean Air Act], Pub. L. No.
81-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
,2Not only is the treatment of each case brief, but the list of cases covered is but
a small portion of the many opinions concerning seventh amendment rights.
" 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (this case involved an action by the United States to recover
a penalty prescribed by sections 4 and 5 of the Alien Immigration Act of March 3,
1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1909)).
" 232 U.S. 37 (1914) (this case involved an action by the United States to recover
a penalty prescribed by section 4 of the Alien Immigration Act of February 20, 1907,
ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 900).
1 213 U.S. 103 at 115; 232 U.S. 37 at.46-47.
16 232 U.S. at 40.
," Id. at 47. The Court stated:
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8 the Court upheld a statute as
However, in Block v. Hirsh"

a temporary solution to the housing crisis in Washington, D.C.,
following World War I. The District of Columbia Rents and
Food Act of October 22, 191919 permitted an administrative body
to make certain factual determinations, 20 even though the parties
might have been deprived of a right to a jury trial in some
actions. Subsequently, in an action for reinstatement and back
pay under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,21 the Court
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.22 briefly discussed the
validity of this Act in light of the seventh amendment. In denying
the defendant a right to a jury trial, the Court stated: "The
instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of
such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law.
It is a statutory proceeding." ' 23 The far-reaching implications of
these two cases were qualified to a degree in subsequent Supreme
Court opinions.2
In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover25 the Supreme Court
held that in a case involving both legal and equitable claims with
a common factual issue, there is a constitutional right to a jury
trial on the legal claim. Thus, the Court held that, barring
unusual circumstances, the legal claim must be tried first. 26 Accordingly, in an action where the plaintiff sought both injunctive
relief and an "accounting" to determine money damages, the
Court in Dairy Queen v. Wood 7 held that the plaintiff was
While the defendant was entitled to have the issues tried before a jury,
this right did not arise from Article III of the Constitution or from the
Sixth Amendment, for both relate to prosecutions which are strictly criminal in their nature, but it did arise out of the fact that in a civil action
of debt involving more than twenty dollars a jury trial is demandable.
(citations omitted).
Id.
'a 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
'9District of Columbia Rents and Food Act, ch. 80, tit. II, 41 Stat. 298 (1919).
For example, the administrative body was permitted to determine fair rent.
2, National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23 Id. at 48.
14 See infra notes 33, 38 and accompanying text.
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
Id. at 511. Otherwise, if an equitable claim is tried first, the legal claim might
be collaterally estopped, thus preventing a jury trial. Id. at 505.
- 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues of the case pursuant
to Beacon Theatres. In determining that the request for an
"accounting" was actually a legal issue, the Court stated that
"the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to
'28
depend upon the choice of the words used in the pleadings.
In Ross v. Bernhard9 the Court demonstrated that the seventh amendment concept which preserves the right to a jury trial
is a dynamic rather than a static one. Here the Court granted a
jury trial in a stockholder's derivative suit, traditionally an equitable action. Since stockholders had no right, at law, to sue
on behalf of a corporation3 ° there was no right to a jury trial.
In Ross, the Court in a footnote suggested an analysis3 to use
in determining a party's seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
Later, the Court largely incorporated the Ross analysis into
Tu//. 32

In Pernell v. Southall Realty 3 the Court held that a party
was entitled to a jury trial in a suit brought under a statute of
the District of Columbia 34 which established a summary procedure for the recovery of possession of real property. In doing
so, Justice Marshall wrote that "Block v. Htirsh merely stands
for the principle that the seventh amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings . . . ,,31 The Court further
stated, in what has been characterized as advice to Congress on
how to avoid the seventh amendment, 36 that the seventh amendment would not be a bar if Congress chose to entrust landlordtenant disputes to an administrative agency. However, in this
instance, since Congress provided that such actions be brought

s Id. at 477-78.
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
30 Because there was no adequate legal remedy, equity courts had jurisdiction. Id.
at 534.
3' "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the premerger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third,
the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538, n. 10.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
3 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
3' D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-1501 to 16-1505 (1970).
35 416 U.S. at 383.
36 Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court'sAssault
on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 1281, 1290 (1978).
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in a court of general jurisdiction, the right to a jury trial attaches.3

Similarly, the Court in Curtis v. Loether38 found a seventh
amendment right to a jury trial in an action brought under
section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 39 which authorized
private parties to bring civil actions to redress violations of the
fair housing provisions under the Act. In Curtis, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, declared that Jones & Laughlin
simply stood for the principle that in administrative proceedings,
the seventh amendment is generally not applicable where jury
trials are incompatible with the concept of administrative adjudication and would interfere with the entirety of the statutory
scheme.40 Justice Marshall went on to say in reference to Jones
41
& Laughlin and Katchen v. Landy:
These cases uphold congressional power to entrust enforcement
of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized
court of equity free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment. But when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts,
where there is obviously no functional justification for denying
the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action
involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in
42
an action of law.

Marshall further observed that the action under the statute
"sounds basically in tort, ' 43 a traditional action at law, and also
that "the relief sought here - actual and punitive damages is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.""4
The preceding cases illustrate the Supreme Court's interpretation of the seventh amendment, particularly regarding statu17 416 U.S. at 383.
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812, 82 Stat. 88 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970)).
38

39

o 415 U.S. at 194.
382 U.S. 323 (1966) (upholding the power of bankruptcy courts, sitting without
a jury, to adjudicate what are normally legal issues on the grounds that a bankruptcy
court is a specialized court of equity).
41 415 U.S. at 195 (footnote omitted).
43 Id.

" Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).
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tory actions. From early dicta acknowledging the amendment's
applicability 4 to later cases evidencing a desire to classify such
actions so as to preclude applicability,'" the Court has shown a
measure of uncertainty. The Court later swung back with holdings expanding the right to a jury trial. 47 More recent opinions
have qualified the applicability of the seventh amendment to
statutory proceedings, and have indicated the analysis to use in
such instances.'" In light of these recent opinions discussed above,
along with Atlas Roofing discussed below, 49 the Supreme Court's
holding in Tull is not surprising and was, in fact, rather predictable.
II.
A.

UNITED STATES V.

TuLL

Factual Background

Edward Tull, an experienced real estate developer, was sued
by the government in July of 1981 for dumping fill at three
locations he was developing on Chincoteaque Island, Virginia.50
The action was brought under the Clean Water Act," and charged

See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 18-23 33, 38 and accompanying text.
47See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text.
41See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
'o United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Va. 1983).
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1982 Supp. IV 1986) provided:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or is in violation of any permit
condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 1342 of this title by him or by a State or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, he shall issue an order
requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he
shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
4'

Id.
Subsection 1319 (b) provided:
The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation
for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection
(a) of this section. Any action under this subsection may be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant
is located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have
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Tull with violations under the sections prohibiting the discharge

without a permit of dredged or fill material into navigable waters
52
of the United States.
Tull did not deny placing the fill at the alleged locations,
nor did he deny that he failed to apply for a permit to do so."
Instead, he argued that the properties filled did not contain
"wetlands ' 5 4 within the meaning of the Act." To find that the
locations did qualify as "wetlands" the trier of fact must deter56
mine that they possess the requisite soil and vegetation types.
jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of
the commencement of such action shall be given immediately to the appropriate state.
Id.
Subsection 1319(d) provided:
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or
1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any
of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the
Administrator, or by a state, or in a permit issued under section 1344 of
this title by a state, and any person who violates any order issued by the
Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall be subjected to a
civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation.
Id.
The reader should be aware that the Water Quality Act of 1987 provides the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Secretary of the Army new authority to assess
administrative penalties under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 319(g) (1987). Under
the analysis used in Tull and discussed below such proceedings would not require that
the violator be provided a jury trial. While a civil action under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) is
still available, it may become less common due to the new administrative route. The
effect of the new administrative authority to assess penalties on the enforcement scheme
of the Clean Water Act is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an analysis of this
new authority see J. Fogarty, A Short History of Federal Water Pollution Control Law,
in CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK 5, 29, 31 (1988).
2 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1344 (1977). The government later amended its complaint
to include a violation of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425,
30 Stat. 1152, (codifed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 401-467(n) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
Mr. Tull did not base his seventh amendment claim on this statute which provides for
injunctive relief but not civil penalties. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414 n.1.
53 615 F. Supp. 610, 625-26.
S' The term "wetlands" means those areas that are inundated or saturated
by surface or ground water at a frequency or duration sufficient to support,
and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1986).
" United States v. Tall, 769 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1985).
56 Note,
United States v. Tull: The Right to Jury Trial Under the Clean Water
Act - The Jury is Still Out, 41 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 665, 671 (1987).
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Tull sought to have this question, on which the experts would
be presenting conflicting evidence, submitted to a jury 7
The district court denied Tull's timely demand for a jury
trial." The court concluded that Tull had illegally discharged fill
in all of the alleged locations. 59 The court, however, substantially
reduced the civil penalties sought by the government from
$22,890,000 to $325,000. 60 Since Tull had sold most of the land
in question to third parties, the government obtained injunctive
relief for only 6,000 of the 1,000,000 square feet covered by the
alleged fillings. 6' The court of appeals affirmed, 62 but questioned
whether the seventh amendment ever applies to government litigation. 63 The court of appeals further observed that even if the
amendment did apply in some cases, it did not apply here, where
the government asked the district court to "exercise statutorily
conferred equitable power in determining the amount of the
fine. '" 64 Lastly, the court of appeals characterized the relief
provided by the Act as a "package" of remedies whereby the
65
money damages sought became incident to the non-legal relief.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 66 to clear up the issue and
67
to resolve a conflict between circuits.
B.

The Supreme Court Opinion

The Supreme Court found that petitioner Tull was entitled
to a jury trial to determine his liability. 6s In doing so, the Court
11Tull

v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 at 415 (1987).

58 Id.

769 F.2d 182, 185.
- 481 U.S. 412, 415.
6, Brief for the Petitioner at 5, United States v. Tull, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)
(No.
85-1259).
62 United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985).
6I Id. at 186-87.
59

IId. at 187.
65 Id.

Tull v. United States, 476 U.S. 1139 (1986).
The circuit court in Tull declined to follow the decision in United States v. J.
B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when the government sues to collect a statutory
civil penalty, there is generally a seventh amendment right to a jury trial even if the
statute did not specifically grant it. Id. at 426.
" 481 U.S. at 427. The Court further found that the petitioner was not entitled
to have a jury determine the amount of the penalty to be assessed. Id. The latter issue
is beyond the scope of this Comment.
6

67
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determined that the pending action was more similar to those
traditionally tried in courts of law than to those tried in courts
of equity or admiralty. 69 To make this determination the Court
used a two-part test. First, the Court compared the action to
"18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to
the merger of law and equity." ' 70 Second, the Court determined
the equitable or legal nature of the remedy sought. 7 1 Applying
this test, Justice Brennan found the action to be similar to an
action in debt, which was traditionally within the jurisdiction of
the English courts of law. 72 Commenting on the government's
attempted analogy of this action to an action to abate a public
nuisance, traditionally of equitable jurisdiction, the Court observed that "characterizing the relief sought is '[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analagous common-law cause of
action. "7
Justice Brennan characterized the relief sought as legal, noting that the civil penalty in question was intended to punish
violators and to deter future violations, not merely to restore
the status quo. 74 Furthermore, the Court held the right to a jury
trial may not be avoided by simply classifying the penalty as
75
"incidental" to the equitable relief granted.
Generally, the Court's opinion held few surprises as it was
well supported by the predecessor cases previously noted.76 However, the importance of the opinion should not be lost in its
apparent simplicity. Tull was another confirmation of a Supreme
Court trend of selective application of the seventh amendment.
Such selective application is well illustrated by distinguishing
Tull from Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health

Review Commission.77

69 Id. at 420.
70

481 U.S. at 417.

Id.
I1 at 417-18.
71 Id. at 420.
71 Id. at 421 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, at 196).
7, Id. at 422-24.
11Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425.
76 See supra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
11430 U.S. 442 (1977).
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Analysis of Tull in Light of Atlas Roofing

The causes of action in Atlas arose under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970,78 the pertinent parts of which
are set out in the Court's opinion. 79 Atlas was actually a corn-

71 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590,
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982)).
Under the Act, inspectors, representing the Secretary of Labor, are
authorized to conduct reasonable safety and health inspections. 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(a). If a violation is discovered, the inspector, on behalf of the
Secretary, issues a citation to the employer fixing a reasonable time for its
abatement and, in his discretion, proposing a civil penalty. §§ 658, 659.
Such proposed penalties may range from nothing for de minimis and
nonserious violations to not more than $1,000 for serious violations, to a
maximum penalty of $10,000 for willful or repeated violations, §§ 658(a),
659(a), 666(a)-(c) and (j).If the employer wishes to contest the penalty or
the abatement order, he may do so by notifying the Secretary of Labor
within 15 days, in which event the abatement order is automatically stayed.
§§ 659(a), (b), 666(d). An evidentiary hearing is then held before an
administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission. The commission consists of three members, appointed for
six-year terms, each of whom is qualified 'by reason of training, education
or experience' to adjudicate contested citations and assess penalties. §§
651(3), 659(c), 661(i). At this hearing the burden is on the Secretary to
establish the elements of the alleged violation and the propriety of his
proposed abatement order and proposed penalty; and the judge is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate any or all of these items, giving due
consideration in his penalty assessment to 'the size of the business of the
employer . . . , the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer,
and the history of previous violations.' § 666(i). The judge's decision
becomes the Commission's final and appealable order unless within 30
days a Commissioner directs that it be reviewed by the full Commission.
§§ 659(c), 661(i). See 29 CFR §§ 2200.90, 2200.91 (1976).
If review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing abatement and the payment of any assessed penalty becomes final unless the
employer timely petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court of
appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). The Secretary similiarly may seek review of
Commission orders, § 660(b), but, in either case, '[t]he findings of the
Commission with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.' § 660(a).
If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the
fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be
retried. § 666(k). Thus, the penalty may be collected without the employer's
ever being entitled to a jury determination of the facts constituting the
violation.
430 U.S. at 445-47 (footnotes omitted).
79

1988-89]

JURY TRIAL

pilation of two separate appeals from two different circuits.8 0
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts,
holding that the petitioners were not entitled to jury trials under

the seventh amendment. 8'
A cursory reading of Tull may give the impression that it
overruled Atlas. In both instances a party was assessed a penalty
for violating the federal statute, and was either enjoined from
further illegal activities8 2 or ordered to correct the problem.

3

However, the seventh amendment issue in Tull turned on whether
the action was of legal or equitable character, while the seventh

amendment issue in Atlas turned on whether an administrative
agency could assess a penalty without a jury ever determining
the facts concerning the allegations. Why the issues addressed

differ is never clearly established in the Tull opinion. This omission merits some consideration.
First of all, the distinction does not lie in what Atlas characterizes as a "public rights" exception to the seventh amendment. s4 Under the reasoning of Crowell v. Benson,85 an authority
cited in Atlas to support such an exception, 6 both Tull and

Atlas are cases involving "public rights."8 s7 Moreover, the sub-

10Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n., 519
F.2d 1200, 1201 (3d Cir. 1975). Petitioner Irey was cited for a willful violation of a
safety standard under the Act requiring certain trenches to be reinforced to protect
employees working within them. He was assessed a penalty of $7,500 by the Secretary,
which was later reduced to $5,000 by the administrative law judges of the Commission.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Commission's orders of
abatement and assessment of the penalty. Id. at 1201-07.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n., 518 F.2d
990 (5th Cir. 1975). Petitioner Atlas was cited for a serious violation of a safety standard
requiring roof opening covers to be secured so as to prevent accidental displacement.
The Secretary ordered abatement of the hazard and assessed a penalty of $600. The
Commission upheld the penalty and the abatement order. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit later affirmed.
430 U.S. at 461.
at 416. Injunctive relief was however, only a small portion of the
82 481 U.S.
remedy in this case because Mr. Tull had sold most of the land in question by the time
the action was filed. Id. at 415.
83 430 U.S. at 447.
Id. at 450-52.
85 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
86 430 U.S. at 452.
87 Crowell characterized "public rights" cases as "those which arise between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of
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stantial difference in the amount of penalties assessed does not
distinguish the cases, since in all instances, the penalties are well
above the twenty dollar minimum required by the seventh

amendment .8
The distinction between Tull and Atlas lies in the respective
statutes under which the actions were brought. The statute involved in Atlas provides for administrative fact-finding and adjudication regarding the sanctions it imposes. s9 The statute 9°
involved in Tull provides for its sanctions to be enforced in the

district courts. 91 Thus in Atlas the court held that, "in cases in
which 'public rights' are being litigated ... the seventh amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding

function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with

'92
which the jury would be incompatible.
The Atlas court concluded that the right to a jury trial
depends also on the forum in which the issue is to be resolved
and not merely on the nature of the issue. 93 This holding has
the effect of allowing Congress, by legislation, to determine the
extent of one's rights under the seventh amendment if the action
is one involving public rights. 94 The Court in a footnote stated

the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments." 285 U.S. at 50.
Crowell goes on to distinguish "private rights" cases as those involving "the liability of
one individual to another under the law as defined." Id. at 51. For a discussion of
"private rights" under a statute, see J. CHtAmfERLArN, N. DowLiNG, P. HAYS, THE
JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATivE AGENCIES 187-90 (1942). The public
rights/private rights doctrine fell into disfavor after Crowell, but was revived in the 1982
case, Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). DAVIS, IV
ADMoNIsTRATIVw LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1984).
11See supra note 1.
19See supra note 79.
For pertinent parts of the statute, see supra note 51.
91 Though the statute provides for issuing an order "or" bringing a civil action in
the appropriate district court, it has been interpreted as not limiting the administrator
to one choice or the other, but rather that he may do either or both. In either instance
the action may end up in the district court. Non-compliance with an order is not required
to justify the imposition of a civil action under section 1319(d). See United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1979). Thus, under Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) a jury trial is required. See supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
,, 430 U.S. at 450.
91 Id. at 461.
9"The Court stressed that most cases, such as those involving private tort, contract,
and many other areas cannot be affected. Id. at 458.
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that it has the power to ultimately determine whether a jury is
required, 95 but it appears that Congress has a good deal of
discretion in this area. 96
Though the Atlas court cited many authorities for its holding, at least one commentator has questioned whether these
authorities truly support the decision. 97 In addition, it should be
pointed out that the concerns the Court has advanced are not
necessarily the most important. For example, the Court expresses
concern about overcrowding the federal courts9" - a legitimate
concern" - but not one which can override a constitutional
guarantee.t ° The Court's concern that extended review may
seriously impair the efficiency of an administrative agency must
also be put in perspective. As the Court said in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,10 "[Clonvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of
democratic government .. ."1o2 Perhaps one may argue that the
remedy at law'013 is so inadequate that a new procedure is necessary, thus providing an analogy to traditional equitable jurisdiction. °4 The Atlas court noted that the Act sought to address
the inadequacy of state statutory and common law actions designed to protect people in the workplace, 05 but the Court never
actually applied the analogy to the case at hand.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tull did not overrule Atlas.
Rather, Tull followed from Atlas and confirmed the Court's

91Id. at 461 n.16.
'

The amount of discretion is still rather unclear. For general discussion on the

topic, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 87-94 (1965).
9 For an in-depth argument on how Atlas was not supported by the precedents it

cites, see Kirst, supra note 36.
9s Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
430 U.S. 442, 445 (1977).
" See H. ZEILSAL, H. KALVEN, JR., B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).
The authors observe that a jury trial takes approximately 16 hours compared to 9 hours
for a bench trial. Id. at 71-81.
See Kirst, supra note 36, at 1342-43.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
,02Id. at 944.
103 That is, the statutory and common law remedies existing prior to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
1o See Note, Application of ConstitutionalGuaranteesof Jury Trial to the Administrative Process, 56 HARv. L. REV. 282, 283 (1942).
0' 430 U.S at 444-45 and n.1.
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trend of permitting Congress, in many instances, to determine a
party's seventh amendment rights in a statutory proceeding. In
evaluating one's right to a jury trial in an action brought under
a statute, one must first determine the forum in which the issues
are to be addressed. If the designated forum is an administrative
tribunal with no de novo review in a court of law, a jury trial
cannot be had. If however, the forum provided is one which
typically uses a jury as a fact-finding body, a right to a jury
trial exists, provided the action is one historically enforced in a
court of law, and more importantly, the relief sought is of a
legal nature. With this analysis in mind, it should be possible to
determine one's right to a jury trial in an action brought under
other statutes.
III.

THE

RIGHT TO

A

JURY TRIAL UNDER

SMCRA

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA)1c ° authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to assess a
civil penalty for violations of any permit conditions or substantive provision of the Act. 0 7 The amount of the penalty can be
substantial - up to $5,000 for each violation, and each day of
a continuing violation may be counted as a separate violation
for purposes of penalty assessment. 0 8 A further penalty of no
less than $750 per day may be assessed against an operator who
fails to timely correct a violation for which he has been cited.' °9
Upon receipt of a proposed penalty assessment, the operator
has thirty days to request a formal hearingO or the penalty
assessment proposal becomes due and payable."' If a formal
hearing is requested, the operator must submit a petition along
with the full amount of the penalty to be held in an escrow
account pending the outcome." 2 This procedure is held before

SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
108 Id.

" SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(h) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

",030 C.F.R. § 723.18 (1986). The operator may first request an informal conference
within 15 days of receipt of the proposed penalty assessment. Such a hearing consists
of a meeting with a conference officer to review the amount of the penalty.
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
"
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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an administrative law judge, and entails a full adversarial, evidentiary hearing" 3 where the operator may 4contest the amount
of the penalty or the fact of the violation."1
In addition to administrative review, SMCRA provides for
review in the United States District Court for the district in
which the mining operation is located." 5 However, such review
is heard solely on the record made before the Secretary, and the
Secretary's findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are
deemed conclusive."16 Such a provision is very similar to the one
contained in the Occupational Safety and Health Act at issue in
the Atlas case. 1 7 Therefore, although the action to collect a civil
penalty under SMCRA is one traditionally tried in the courts of
law according to Tull, the statutory procedure outlined in the
Act precludes the application of the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial.

IV.

THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL UNDER THE CLEAN

AIR

ACT

Section 7413(a) of the Clean Air Act"' authorizes the Administrator, on the basis of information available to him, to
issue an order or bring a civil action for various violations of
the Act."19 The Administrator may commence a civil action for
a temporary or permanent injunction, and he may assess and
recover a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day for violation of
acts listed in section 7413(b)(l)-(5). 20 Section 7413(b) provides
further that:
Any action under this subsection may be brought in the district
court of the United States for the district in which the violation
occurred or in which the defendant resides or has his principal

"ISee

e.g., Blackhawk Mining Co., Inc. v. Andrus, 711 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir.

1983).
30 C.F.R. § 723.19 (1986).
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1),(2),(3),(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9 The Clean Air Act contains different enforcement provisions for different parts
of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7423, 7524, 7545(d) (1982). Section 7413 was chosen
here for illustrative purposes.
1- 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982).
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place of business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to
restrain such violation, to require compliance [and] to assess
such civil penalty ....

121

The provision for a civil action under section 7413 of the
Clean Air Act is very similar to that previously mentioned under

the Clean Water Act. 2 2 Section 7413 of the Clean Air Act
provides for bringing the action in a federal district court - a
forum which frequently uses a jury as a fact-finding body.
Moreover, unlike SMCRA 123 or the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970,124 no provision is made for initial fact-

finding by the administrative agency. The civil action provided
for by the Clean Air Act is very similar to the civil action
provided by the Clean Water Act, and therefore the action under
the Clean Air Act can also be characterized as an action in debt
which was traditionally within the jurisdiction of the English
courts of law. More importantly, the relief sought in such an
action should be characterized as legal for the same reason the
relief sought was so characterized in Tull 21 - the penalty is not
merely intended to restore the status quo but rather to punish
violators and deter future violations. 126 One has, therefore, a
seventh amendment jury trial right in actions by the government
seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under section 7413(b)
27
of the Clean Air Act.

121

Id.

1- 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23 See supra notes 107-117 and accompanying text.
,2 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
1 But cf. United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., No. 85 C 6993, slip op. (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 28, 1986). The Wholesale Oil court denied the defendant a right to a jury trial
under the Clean Air Act by characterizing the relief provided by the Act as essentially
equitable. The civil penalty assessment here was brought under authority of 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(d) (1982) which calls for administrative assessment of the penalty. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 22.01-22.33. Thus, although the rationale given for denying a jury trial to the
defendant would today appear inconsistent with Tull, the result of the case is probably
correct.
.27 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982) also provides for commencement of a civil action
in
federal district court for recovery of any noncompliance penalty or nonpayment penalty
for which any person is liable under section 7420 of the Act. Section 7420 is intended
to supplement the civil and criminal sanctions of section 7413. Those penalties are in
addition to any civil or criminal enforcement proceedings brought under any provision
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision, Tull v. United States, did not
open any floodgates in the federal courts for seventh amendment
rights to a jury trial. Rather, the Court confirmed existing rights
by following established precedents. The Court reaffirmed that
the seventh amendment applies to government actions to collect
civil penalties under a statute, provided that the action is brought
in a forum traditionally employing a jury as a fact-finding body.
However, if Congress chooses to relegate the action to an administrative tribunal, a jury trial is unavailable. Perhaps a better
way to proceed in this area is to first determine, by the analysis
provided in Tull, whether an action is one traditionally tried in
the courts of law. If it is, a party is entitled to a jury trial. If
it is not, then Congress may assign the action to an administrative proceeding. Such an expansion of seventh amendment rights
however, would go at least one step beyond Tull.
JOHN

A.

KOLANZ

of the Act or state or local law. 42 U.S.C. § 7420(0 (1982). See also Duquesne Light
Co. v. E.P.A., 698 F.2d 456, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1983). However, an action under section
7420 would not create a seventh amendment right to a jury trial under the reasoning of
Tull. First of all, the penalty is assessed by the Administrator, not the courts. Appeals
from a penalty assessment are through administrative channels. 42 U.S.C. § 7420(b)(5)
(1982). Moreover, the relief provided by section 7420 is intended to remove the economic
benefits of noncompliance and to place polluters on the same economic footing as those
who are complying with the Act - i.e., to restore the status quo. Duquesne Light Co.,
698 F.2d at 463. Therefore, the relief sought under section 7420 should be characterized
as equitable, which precludes a right to a jury trial under Tull.

